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ABSTRACT
Over the past few decades, the emergence of private companies pursuing space
exploration proves that venturing into the final frontier is no longer exclusive to
government-run operations. From satellites to rocket boosters, billions of dollars
worth of private property flies into space every year. However, the expansion of these
private companies creates unique jurisdictional challenges for patenting private
inventions and processes in outer space. This comment examines what jurisdictional
claims and remedies arise when a private third-party commits patent infringement in
an outer space jurisdiction that did not issue the patent.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the year 2020, a private American space company spends millions of dollars of
research and development on a more efficient pressurizing method for lab modules on
the International Space Station (“ISS”). The new pressurizing system allows oxygen to
flow faster through the lab module making it safer for individuals onboard to travel
through ISS compartments. After its demonstrated success, the space company
patents their process before marketing it to various space-faring nations through a
vigorous bidding process. After some haggling, the U.S. government agrees to pay the
company to use the process on their section of the ISS. Several months later, the space
company travels into space and institutes the method on the U.S. section of the ISS. A
year later, the Russian government requests that the same pressurizing method be
performed on their ISS section. However, the Russian government and the American
space company fails to negotiate on a price for the procedure. Instead, a private
Russian space company performs the same pressurizing method on the Russian section
of the ISS. Upon learning of this mission, the U.S. space company wants to sue the
Russian space company for patent infringement but are unsure if they can present a
sufficient patent infringement claim.
This comment will explore what jurisdictional claims and remedies arise when a
private third-party commits patent infringement in an outer space jurisdiction that
did not issue the patent. Part II presents an analysis of current patent protections and
remedies available in outer space infringement. This framework includes a description
of the relationship between outer space international agreements and patent
infringement concerns. Part III will discuss a possible outcome when applying the legal
framework to a process patent infringement in outer space. Part IV will suggest that
a new regulatory framework is necessary to protect private patent rights in outer space
because existing international treaties and agreements are inadequate.
II. BACKGROUND
A patent is a simple legal guarantee.1 This guarantee grants the right to “exclude
others from making using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the
United States or importing the invention into the United States.”2 If the patent holder
has patented a process, the patent guarantees them the right to exclude unauthorized
individuals from using the patented item or process.3
*

© Bill Warners 2020. Juris Doctorate Candidate, May 2021, at UIC John Marshall Law School;
B.A. in History, Calvin University (2017).
1 John M. Golden, Patent Trolls and Patent Remedies, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2111, 2118 (2007).
2 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2013).
3 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69–71 (1972).
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What inventions or processes a patent covers are as equally as important as what
entity guarantees the right of exclusion to the patent holder. French patents are
guaranteed by the French government, German patents by the German government,
and U.S. patents are guaranteed by the U.S. government.4 This guarantee is so
fundamental that the U.S. Constitution specifically mentions the establishment of a
patent system.5 The U.S. government also guarantees protection if an outside party
explicitly breaches the rights of the patent holder. A patent holders’ rights are
infringed if anyone “without authority makes, uses, offers to sell or sells” a patented
invention.6 A patent holders’ rights of exclusivity are similarly infringed if a party
imports a patented invention into the U.S.7 However, U.S. courts assert that
unauthorized use of patented inventions do not need to be an exact copy of the original
patent to be considered patent infringement.8
If a patentholder cannot prove literal patent infringement, they may still be able
to recover under the doctrine of equivalents. In the landmark case Graver Tank &
Manufacturing Company v. Linde Air Prods., Inc, two competing companies produced
two welding compositions that were almost identical with only one of them being
patented.9 The only difference between the patented and non-patented welding
composition was that the non-patented composition used two different silicates.10 As a
result, the Supreme Court had to determine whether the slight compositional change
was a recognizable patent infringement.11 The Court held that since the alleged
infringing process “performs the same or a similar function in a substantially different
way” it could still be counted as infringing on the original patent.12
Though patent holders have options of pursuing patent infringement claims, their
remedies are quickly curtailed outside domestic borders.13 Though there are some laws
combining international jurisdiction with U.S. laws, U.S. held patents are difficult to

Consolidated Appropriations Act, 35 U.S.C. § 1 (1999).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.8. (“To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for
limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and
discoveries.”).
6 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2013).
7 See Ronald D. Hantman, Patent Infringement, 72 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 454, 459
(1990); see also Carbice Corp. of Am. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 33 (1931) (“Infringement,
whether direct or contributory, is essentially a tort, and implies invasion of some right of the
patentee.”). But see Megan M. La Belle, Patent Litigation, Personal Jurisdiction, and the Public Good,
18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 43, 47 (2010).
8 Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 28 (1997); see also Festo Corp. v.
Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 737 (2002) (holding that patent claim
amendments do not preclude a patent holder from making a claim under the doctrine of equivalents).
See generally John G. Rauch, The Realities of Our Times: The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of
1984 and the Evolution of the Semiconductor Industry, 3 FORDHAM ENT. MEDIA & INTELL. PROP. L.F.
403, 406 (1993) (identifying that patenting processes for emerging technologies is risky considering
competitors).
9 Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605, 610 (1950).
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id. at 608.
13 See generally Michael Farbiarz, Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction, 114 MICH. L. REV. 507,
514 (2016) (“[F]or all the attention paid to jurisdiction, its domains have not been fully mapped.”).
4
5
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protect outside the U.S. due to international territorial issues.14 For example, imagine
that in Graver Tank & Manufacturing Company v. Linde Air Prods., Inc, the company
that held the patented welding composition was in the U.S., but the infringing
company was a Chinese company.15 Even if the Supreme Court ruled the exact same
way, the Chinese government is not bound by the authority of a U.S. court. Though
there are some instances where extraterritorial jurisdiction is permitted, these
instances are typically outliers and focused more on “activities that impact currency,
immigration and economic interests.”16
A simple way to procure patent protection in a foreign country or region is to apply
and receive a patent in that country.17 Regional patent offices allow regional patent
applications to cover a specific geographic area instead of a singular country.18 Patents
in each of these regional organizations provide patent protection in each country that
is a member.
In addition to direct and regional applications, international treaties also provide
patent filing rights to its member countries. For example, the Paris Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property (“Paris Convention”) provides an international
14 E.g., Timothy R. Holbrook, What Counts as Extraterritorial in Patent Law, 25 B. U. J. SCI. &
TECH. L. 291, 296 (2019) (“Many foreign activities qualify as prior art for determining the validity of
U.S. patents.”); see also Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2012) (stating that in some
instances, U.S. companies may be criminally or civilly liable if they bribe foreign officials). See
generally Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895) (“[I]t is the recognition which one nation allows
within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard
both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens, or of other persons
who are under the protection of its laws.”).
15 Protecting
Intellectual
Property
Rights
(IPR)
Overseas,
USPTO.GOV,
https://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/international-protection/protecting-intellectualproperty-rights-ipr (last modified Nov. 1 2019, 1:40 PM) (suggesting that even if the infringement was
purposefully stolen, U.S. patentholders do not automatically have a claim against foreign
infringement the same way they do against domestic infringement); see, e.g., Smith v. United States,
507 U.S. 197, 204 (1993) (“[W]e hold that the FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity does not apply to
tort claims arising in Antarctica.”); see also Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. 183, 190 (1856) (“The private
right of every patentee is subject to the public right of the Government, to admit into the ports of the
United States any foreign vessel, free from any private or public charges, tolls, or burdens, other than
those imposed by treaty or by the laws of nations.”). See generally Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram
Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 531 (1972) (“The statute makes it clear that it is not an infringement to make or
use a patented product outside of the United States.”).
16 Dariush Keyhani, U.S. Patent Law and Extraterritorial Reach, 7 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP.
51, 65 (2005).
17 Masaaki Kotabe, Evolving Intellectual Property Protection in the World: Promises and
Limitations, 1 U. PUERTO RICO BUS. L.J. 12, 14 (2010).
18 Directory of Intellectual Property Offices, WIPO, https://www.wipo.int/directory/en/urls.jsp (last
visited Oct. 6, 2019); see Josephine Asmah, Historical Threads: Intellectual Property Protection of
Traditional Textile Designs: The Ghanaian Experience and African Perspectives, 15 IJCP 271, 283
(2008); see also Patents-OAPI, SPOOR FISHER, https://www.spoor.com/en/africa-ip-expertise/oapipatents/ (last visited Dec. 2, 2019) (“OAPI registrations afford protection in: Benin, Burkina-Faso,
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Republic of), Comoros, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon,
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Togo. All OAPI States
have ratified the Patent Co-operation Treaty. Therefore, an OAPI Regional Phase of a PCT
International Application will automatically include all member states.”). See generally Tshimanga
Kongolo, The New OAPI Agreement as Revised in February 1999: Complying with TRIPS, 3 J. WORLD
INTELL. PROP. 717, 721 (2000) (emphasizing that the 1999 OAPI Agreement extrapolated from TRIPS
and offers significant protections to patent holders by offering both civil and criminal remedies for
instances of infringement).
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framework for patent reciprocity that covers rights granted to foreign nationals, the
guarantee of propriety interest in patent applications, and common rules of
application.19 Most importantly, the Paris Convention extends a type of tangential
citizenship to patent applicants and promises that they will be treated like the citizens
of that host country.20
International patent rights are also available through the Patent Cooperation
Treaty (“PCT”) which allows States who have signed the Paris Convention to become
signatories.21 The PCT allows a nation or resident of a member State to file one
application as opposed to filing multiple patent applications in different States or
regions.22
Similarly, the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) chose to extend trade
protections through The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (“TRIPS”).23 Though TRIPS was a controversial agreement at the time, its
continued enforcement represents an attempt to use trade as a vehicle to protect
intellectual property rights.24 Most importantly, TRIPS establishes minimum
standards that governments must follow to protect and enforce the intellectual
property of other member States.25 TRIPS promises that the offending member State
is liable for the unauthorized use of the patented item and that the patent holder will
19 Convention of Paris for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 2-4, Oct. 31, 1958, 21 U.S.T.
1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter Paris Convention]. See generally Alfredo C. Jr. Robles, History of
the Paris Convention, 15 WORLD BULL. 1, 6 (1999) (arguing that the Paris Convention curtailed filing
patents in multiple countries).
20 See Donald G. Daus, Paris Convention Priority, 77 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 138, 138
(1995) (“It is no longer enough for the priority application to disclose only so much of the claimed
invention as is disclosed in the intervening reference: the claim must be completely described in the
Convention document.”); see also Paris Convention, supra note 19, at arts. 2-4 (stating that foreign
nationals must be protected the same way as the signatory state would protect its own citizens).
21 Patent Cooperation Treaty, Preamble, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645, 9 I.LM. 978.
22 Id.
23 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights arts. 27-34, Apr. 15, 1994,
1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS].
24 See Edward Lee, Measuring TRIPs Compliance and Defiance: The WTO Compliance Scorecard,
18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 401, 405 (2011) (“For the first time in history, countries recognized an
international institution that had enforcement power—putatively with teeth—to help ensure
countries complied with their international obligations regarding the minimum standards of IP
protection.”). Contra Susan K. Sell, TRIPs Was Never Enough: Vertical Forum Shifting, FTAS, ACTA,
and TPP, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 447, 475 (2011); but see Peter K. Yu, TRIPs and Its Achilles’ Heel, 18
J. INTELL. PROP. L. 479, 499 (2011). See generally Amir Attaran, The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS
Agreement and Public Health, Access to Pharmaceuticals, and Options under WTO Law, 12 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 859, 860 (2002) (arguing that the comprehensive and expanding reach
of WTO’s influence into intellectual property may cause tension when considering how to properly
protect trade goods in developing TRIPS member countries).
25 TRIPS, supra note 23, at art. 27 (“[P]atents shall be available for any inventions, whether
products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step
and are capable of industrial application.”); see also Emir Aly Crowne, Fishing TRIPS: A Look at the
History of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property, 2 CREIGHTON INT’L &
COMP. L.J. 77, 89 (2011) (“The [TRIPS] proposals detailed the acquisition and enforcement of
intellectual property rights and the application of basic principles such as national treatment and
most-favored nation.”). See generally John Linarelli, Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights and Biotechnology: European Aspects, 6 Sing. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 406, 410 (2002) (arguing that
TRIPS was reluctantly adopted by developing countries due to disagreements on how to implement
certain rigorous standard aspects combined with WTO obligations).
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be compensated.26 The complexity of intergovernmental agreements and international
treaties demonstrates how jurisdictional issues extend to property rights in outer
space.27
On October 5th, 1957, the Soviet Union launched the first artificial satellite
named “Sputnik” into low earth orbit.28 Two years after Sputnik’s launch, the United
Nations (“UN”) formally established the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space (“COPUOS”).29 COPUOS, which still exists today, represented a
formalized international approach to outer space activity.30 Ten years later, the U.N.
adopted a resolution which created an outer space treaty called the Treaty on
Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer
Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (“Outer Space Treaty”).31 The
Outer Space Treaty requires that all signatories of the treaty “bear international
responsibility for national activities in outer space.”32 This international responsibility
in space translated into extending the jurisdiction of the signatory State that launched
the space object.33

TRIPS, supra note 23, at art. 31.
E.g., Patents in Space Act, 35 U.S.C. § 105 (1990); see also Jocelyn H. Shoemaker, The Patents
in Space Act: Jedi Mind Trick or Real Protection for American Inventors on the International Space
Station, 6 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 395, 398 (1999) (“The Act is, therefore, meant to encourage private
investment in space science and commercial activities by ensuring that the investments of United
States’ inventors will be protected. The Act purports to do this by extending United States jurisdiction
to its space objects, thus making the objects themselves, and any activities carried out within the
objects, subject to the laws of the United States.”). See Glenn H. Reynolds, Patents in Space Act, 3
HARV. J. L. & TECH. 13, 16 (1990). See generally Dave Baiocchi & William IV Welser, The
Democratization of Space, 94 FOREIGN AFF. 98, 100 (2015) (arguing that in the future outer space
private activities could extend to billionaires, juntas, and criminal organizations).
28 Vladimir Isachenkov, Sputnik at 50, ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER (Oct. 1, 2007, 3:00AM),
https://www.ocregister.com/2007/10/01/sputnik-at-50/.
29 G.A. Res. 1472(XIV), at 1 (Dec. 12, 1959).
30 F. Kenneth Schwetje, The Development of Space Law and a Federal Space Law Bar, 35 FED. B.
NEWS & J. 316, 316 (1988); accord Tare C. Brisibe, An Introduction to United Nations COPUOS
Recommendations on National Legislation Relevant to the Peaceful Exploration and Use of Outer
Space, 62 ZLW 729, 732 (2013); see Dan L. Burk, Protection of Trade Secrets in Outer Space Activity:
A Study in Federal Preemption, 23 SETON HALL L. REV. 560, 566 (1993).
31 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer
Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies art. 1, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610
U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
32 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 31, at art. 7.
33 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 31, at art. 8 (“A State Party to the Treaty on whose registry an
object launched into outer space is carried shall retain jurisdiction and control over such object, and
over any personnel thereof, while in outer space or on a celestial body.”); see Peter Lykke HessellundJensen, Some Problems concerning the Creation and Implementation of the Treaty on Principles
Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and
Other Celestial Bodies, 38 NORDISK TIDSSKRIFT INT’L RET 97, 100 (1968); see also Kurt G. Hammerle
& Theodore U. Ro, The Extra-Territorial Reach of U.S. Patent Law on Space-Related Activities: Does
the International Shoe Fit as We Reach for the Stars, 34 J. SPACE L. 241, 275 (2008) (“[T]he relative
proximity of space objects, registered under different nations, has the potential to strain existing
patent law and the territorial nature to which it is based upon.”). See generally Dan L. Burk,
Application of United States Patent Law to Commercial Activity in Outer Space, 6 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L. J. 295, 354 (1990) (“[A] colorable argument can be made that United
States patent jurisdiction already extends to the activity aboard United States spacecraft, continued
private investment in space ventures requires the certainty of congressional action.”).
26
27
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The international community established another legal framework for outer space
activity and passed the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by
Space Objects (“Liability Convention”).34 The Liability Convention includes territorial
aspects that hold states liable for any type of space object launched from their
jurisdiction.35 If the space object causes damage to other space property, then the State
that owned the object is held liable for the damage caused.36 Additionally, if multiple
States jointly launch a space object, the Liability Convention holds them jointly and
severally liable for any damage caused by the object.37 Even though the Liability
Convention does not extend State liability to private citizens, it does extend protections
if their property is damaged.38
Near the end of the twentieth century, spacefaring countries shifted their focus
from traveling into space to staying in space and built the International Space Station
(“ISS”).39 However, constructing and maintaining a human habitat orbiting the planet
presented potential jurisdictional management issues.40 A multinational research
station means a convergence of multiple overlapping jurisdictions within close
proximity to each other.41 As a result of the complex jurisdictional issues, multiple
spacefaring international partners created a legal framework to operate the ISS called
the 1998 International Space Station Agreement (“ISS Agreement”).42 The ISS
Agreement specifically provides its signatories protection for any type of intellectual
property issue arising out of an activity on, in, or in transit to the ISS.43 Even though
modern space travel is typically internationally cooperative, there is still national
tension between signatories of the ISS Agreement.44 The ISS Agreement also allows
34 Convention on the International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects art.1, Mar. 29,
1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter Liability Convention].
35 Id.
36 W. F. Foster, The Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects,
10 CAN. Y.B. INT’L L. 137, 139 (1972); see Carl Q. Christol, International Liability for Damage Caused
by Space Objects, 74 AM. J. INT’L L. 346, 350 (1980).
37 Foster, supra note 36, at 139.
38 Id.
39 Ken Pedersen, Space Station: Risks and Vision, 14 J. SPACE L. 1, 4 (1986).
40 See John E. O'Brien, The U.S./International Space Station, 15 J. SPACE L. 35, 37 (1987).
41 See generally U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, Opinion Letter on
Unconstitutional Restrictions on Activities of the Office of Science and Technology Policy (Sept. 19,
2011) (opining that Congressional appropriations act preventing the White House Office of Science
and Technology from cooperating with the Chinese government at U.S. space facilities violated the
President’s article II constitutional authority to operate foreign relations of the U.S.).
42 Agreement Among the Government of Canada, Governments of the Member States of the
European Space Agency, the Government of Japan, the Government of the Russian Federation, and
the Government of the United States of America Concerning Cooperation on the Civil International
Space Station, art. 1-4, ¶1, Jan. 29, 1998, 1 U.S.T. 113 [hereinafter ISS Agreement].
43 Id. at art. 21.
44 R. Oosterlinck, The Intergovernmental Space Station Agreement and Intellectual Property
Rights, 17 J. SPACE L. 23, 27 (1989) (considering patent issues if an invention is made on the space
station by multiple inventors of different nationalities); see George Paul Sloup, Conflict Resolution for
Space Station Crew Members – The Space Station Intergovernmental Agreement and Beyond, 32 PROC.
ON L. OUTER SPACE 404, 410 (1989); see also Andre Farand, Space Station Cooperation, 22 ANNALS
AIR & SPACE L. 441, 445 (1997) (“The Partners have nevertheless laid strong emphasis on the need
for the closest possible adherence to the philosophy of an integrated space station.”). See generally
Hans P. Sinha, Criminal Jurisdiction on the International Space Station, 30 J. SPACE L. 85, 90 (2004)
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its signatories to withdraw from the agreement when all the signatories reach a
decision concerning the withdrawal conditions.45 Regardless of a signatories’ actions,
the ISS Agreement is limited to the national entities who signed the agreement or
private parties invited by its signatories.
III. ANALYSIS
Signatory countries in international agreements identify what rights they want
to protect, the scope of that protection, and the necessary enforcement and punitive
measures. This identification and subsequent enforcement creates legal territorial
boundaries to supplement actual geographic borders.46 Like many other international
treaties, treaties regarding space activity follow the same method of identifying rights
and offering protections.47 This method is used in international agreements such as
the Outer Space Treaty, the Registration Convention, the Liability Convention, and
the 1998 ISS Agreement. However, rights identified in the current outer space treaties
and agreements reveal gaps in the rights and protections of patents in outer space.48
For instance, the Outer Space Treaty broadly protects space objects, pieces of
space objects, space vehicles, and the people of the signatory nations in outer space.49
The Outer Space Treaty emphasizes an imprecise desire to “contribute to broad
international co-operation in . . . the legal aspects of the exploration and use of outer
space for peaceful purposes.”50 After that general statement, the rest of the treaty
focuses on broad principles of national sovereignty and jurisdiction.51 However, the
(“[T]he mere fact that the ISS Partners have agreed on a framework for exerting their criminal
jurisdiction over acts which might occur on the ISS, does not mean that those acts have to be judged
according to each Partner’s municipal criminal code.”).
45 ISS Agreement, supra note 42, at art. 28.
46 See Stephen Gorove, The Growth of Domestic Space Law: A U.S. Example, 18 J. SPACE L. 99,
101 (1990) (demonstrating that “[I]nternational customary law as well as international treaty law
concluded by the United States, is a part of United States law. Under the federal constitution treaties
are the supreme law of the land and no less binding on the courts than federal statutes.”).
47 See Eng Teong See, Commercialization of Space Activities - The Laws and Implications, 82 J.
AIR L. & COM. 145, 148 (2017) (asserting that “[w]hether the international legal framework is
sufficient to deal with commercialization of space activities would prima facie depend on the nature
of the activity concerned and the international law, if any, that applies to it.”).
48 See generally Paul Stephen Dempsey, National Laws Governing Commercial Space Activities:
Legislation, Regulation, & Enforcement, 36 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 1, 14 (2016) (arguing that “neither
the Outer Space Treaty nor any of the other space conventions identify the contours of any particular
licensing regime”).
49 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 31, at arts. 5-9. See generally Ram Jakhu, Legal Issues Relating
to the Global Public Interest in Outer Space, 32 J. SPACE L. 31, 34 (2006) (arguing that “[t]he Outer
Space Treaty is not a collection of idealistic goals without legal implications . . . . The Treaty’s
principles must be interpreted as legally authoritative norms that govern international relations in
all matters relating to outer space.”).
50 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 31, at art. 2.
51 He Qizhi, The Outer Space Treaty in Perspective, 25 J. SPACE L. 93, 97 (1997); see also Mitchell
M. Hsieh, The Work of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), 23 ANNALS
AIR & SPACE L. 293, 298 (1998) (“[D]elegations agreed that with the rapid evolution of technology
and organization of space activities, the Legal Subcommittee must maintain its leading role in
developing legal principles, by identifying desirable improvements to existing legal principles and
instruments governing the peaceful use of outer space.”).
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Outer Space Treaty does not clearly define the term “legal aspects” much less what
legal enforcement measures exist for signatory nations.52 Furthermore, the Outer
Space Treaty does not explicitly mention protections granted to intellectual property.53
The Outer Space Treaty does not define the actions of non-state actors or their
outer space activities.54 The treaty states that “activities of non-governmental entities
in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall require
authorization and continuing supervision by the appropriate State Party to the
Treaty.”55 This statement seems to suggest that private parties are regulated by their
launching nations—if the nations are signatories to the treaty. However, the treaty
never defines what “non-governmental entities” are nor what rights they have.
Furthermore, the treaty is “open to all States,” not non-state private spacefaring
organizations.56 Finally, the Outer Space Treaty never addresses the actions of nonsignatory nations in outer space or nations who are nonmembers of the United Nations
entirely.57
Like the Outer Space Treaty, the Registration Convention focuses on the
ownership of space objects rather than intellectual property claims.58 Under the
Registration Convention, signatory nations must register any space object with the
United Nations so that the object is identifiable.59 The purpose for identification is so
that the launching State’s space object is readily identifiable by the international

52 See Pablo M.J. Mendes de Leon, A Tour d'Horizon of Contemporary Issues in Air and Space
Law, 8 ISSUES AVIATION L. & POL’Y 135, 139 (2009) (“There are no specific international rules
regulating the commercial use of outer space. Liability for activities carried out in outer space and for
journeys from and to outer space is regulated in a rudimentary fashion only, and only provides for
state liability.”).
53 David Tan, Towards a New Regime for the Protection of Outer Space as the Province of All
Mankind, 25 YALE J. INT'L L. 145, 165 (2000) (positing that “[w]here a treaty provides only for general
goals and statements of policy, it is itself “soft” and is devoid of any significant legal content”).
54 See Andrzej Gorbiel, Orbiting Inhabited Space Stations: Selected International Legal Aspects,
7 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 509, 510 (1984) (highlighting that treaties like the Outer Space
Treaty also “do not define such pivotal notions as “outer space,” “space activities” and “celestial body,”
although the instruments make frequent use of these terms”).
55 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 31, at art. 2.
56 See P. J. Blount, Renovating Space: The Future of International Space Law, 40 DENV. J. INT’L
L. & POL’Y 515, 518 (2011) (asserting that “[w]hile future commercial activities were to a small extent
envisioned, international space law was built on the principle that space activities are uniquely state
controlled activities. To this end the negotiators sought to control state actions as opposed to those
private actors.”).
57 See generally Non-member states, UNITED NATIONS, https://www.un.org/en/sections/memberstates/non-member-states/index.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2019) (stating that “[n]on-member States
having received a standing invitation to participate as observers in the sessions and the work of the
General Assembly and maintaining permanent observer missions at Headquarters”).
58 See generally Karl-Heinz Bockstiegel, Settlement of Disputes Regarding Space Activities, 21 J.
SPACE L. 1, 12 (1993) (emphasizing that the term “space object” has a broad definition which “leaves
the fundamental issue of what is or is not a space object or under what circumstances an object
becomes or ceases to be a ‘space object’”).
59 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space art 5., 14 I.L.M. 43 (1975)
[hereinafter Registration Convention]; see, e.g., Charles Dalfen, Towards an International Convention
on the Registration of Space Objects: The Gestation Process, 9 CAN. Y.B. INT’L L. 252, 255 (1971).

[19:365 2020]
Patents 254 Miles Up:
Jurisdictional Issues Onboard the International Space Station

373

community in case of an accident.60 Like the Outer Space Treaty, the Registration
Convention does not mention private third-parties and emphasizes that the
registration is for nations to “bear international responsibility for their national
activities and outer space.”61
Additionally, although the Registration Convention defines the term “space
object”, it similarly fails to address jurisdiction issues of component parts of space
objects. In part, this likely occurred because few countries in 1972 could manufacture
space objects, and those who could did not want to share their manufacturing secrets.62
However, almost fifty years later, space objects are manufactured and tested by
multiple organizations before they get sent into space.63 As a result, it is unclear how
to apply the Registration Convention to a space object which has multiple component
parts registered to different countries.64
This responsibility for launching a State’s space objects similarly extends into the
Liability Convention.65 The crucial difference between the Liability Convention, the
Outer Space Treaty, and the Registration Convention is that in the Liability
Convention, non-state actors are identified.66 The Liability Convention states that the
provision of the agreement does not apply to damage caused to a space object from a
launching State to “nationals of that launching state.”67 However, even though the
Liability Convention broadly defines damage, launching States cannot recover for
patent infringement.68 Under the Liability Convention, damage is defined as “loss of
60 Registration Convention, supra note 59, at arts. 5-6; see also Thomas Beer, Specific Risks
Associated with Collisions in Outer Space and the Return to Earth of Space Objects - The Legal
Perspective, 25 AIR & SPACE L. 42, 47 (2000) (arguing that the Registration Convention has a limited
application since it only requires minimal information from member states and some space objects
with military applications are not covered under the convention).
61 Registration Convention, supra note 59, at pmbl.
62 See generally Klaus Knorr, On the International Implications of Outer Space, 12 WORLD POL.
564, 566 (1960) (predicting that “[i]n the competitive cold-war situation, military and prestige
considerations will impel both nations to press ahead with space activities, with neither being able to
afford quitting the race”).
63 Garrett
Shea, 2019 Deep Space Exploration Systems Supplier Locations, NASA,
https://www.nasa.gov/specials/ESDSuppliersMap/ (last updated Feb. 5, 2020) (For example, for the
deep space Orion program, NASA used over two thousand suppliers from over twenty different states
in the U.S alone); see Satellite Manufacturers and Subcontractors, SPACE CAREERS,
https://www.space-careers.com/manufacturers.html (last visited, Oct. 21, 2019).
64 Wybo P. Heere, Problems of Jurisdiction in Air and Outer Space, 24 AIR & SPACE L. 70, 79
(1999).
65 Liability Convention, supra note 34, at art. 7; see Andre G. Debusschere, Liability for Damage
Caused by Space Objects, 3 J. INT’L L. & PRAC. 97, 100 (1994). See generally Ricky J. Lee, The
Australian Space Activities Act: Creating a Regulatory Regime for Space Activities, 25 AIR & SPACE L.
57, 57 (2000) (stating that a Soviet Union nuclear satellite crashed in Canada and was settled between
the Soviet Union and Canada without the use of the Liability Convention).
66 Liability Convention, supra note 34, at art. 7.
67 Id. (stating that the same provision applies to “foreign nationals during such time as they are
participating in the operation of that space object from the time of its launching or at any stage
thereafter until its descent, or during such time as they are in the immediate vicinity of a planned
launching or recovery area as the result of an invitation by that launching State”).
68 See generally Steven Freeland, There’s a Satellite in My Backyard - Mir and the Convention on
International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, 24 U.N.S.W.L.J. 462, 465 (2001) (arguing
that the general principles of the treaty fails to provide adequate recovery because the formal dispute
resolution provision is based on the good faith of both parties participating instead of a more formal
system).
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life, personal injury or other impairment of health; or loss of or damage to property of
States or of persons, natural or juridical, or property of international
intergovernmental organizations.”69 Even though this definition could possibly cover
patent infringement, the Liability Convention does not apply to private third-party
patent infringement. As a result, the Liability Convention could not adequately protect
against third-party patent infringement.
In contrast, the ISS Agreement provides a more comprehensive patent protection
framework in outer space than the aforementioned treaties.70 The ISS Agreement
acknowledges that the operation and maintenance of the ISS requires international
cooperation and private party involvement.71 Under the ISS Agreement, this
cooperation requires authorized transfers of “technical data and goods by persons or
entities other than the Partners or their Cooperating Agencies (for example, companyto-company exchanges which are likely to develop).”72
The ISS Agreement assures its members that they are not required to make a
transfer of data or goods if another member does not grant patent protection.73 In
addition, offering patent protection during international exchanges, the ISS
Agreement also prioritizes patent protection in an article exclusively dedicated to
intellectual property.74 The ISS agreement first extends the territorial jurisdiction of
its member countries so extensively that any “activity occurring in or on a Space
Station flight element shall be deemed to have occurred in the territory of the Partner
State of that element.”75 Additionally, the ISS Agreement stipulates that the
temporary presence in a different jurisdiction on the ISS or in transit to the ISS is not
grounds alone for patent infringement.76
Furthermore, the ISS Agreement provides strict guidelines to member States for
interacting with private spacefaring entities.77 Private entities may not own any
equipment or pieces of equipment without the prior authorization of the other
members.78 Members also may not use private elements that have not been approved

Liability Convention, supra note 34, at art. 1.
ISS Agreement, supra note 42, arts. 1-4; see Lara L. Manzione, Multinational Investment in the
Space Station: An Outer Space Model for International Cooperation, 18 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 507, 510
(2002).
71 ISS Agreement, supra note 42, at art. 19.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id. at art. 21; see also Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization
art 2., July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1749, 828 U.N.T.S. 3 (defining intellectual property as “rights relating
to: literary, artistic and scientific works, performances of performing artists, phonograms, and
broadcasts, inventions in all fields of human endeavor, scientific discoveries, industrial designs,
trademarks, service marks, and commercial names and designations, protection against unfair
competition, and all other rights resulting from intellectual activity in the industrial, scientific,
literary or artistic fields”).
75 ISS Agreement, supra note 42, at art. 21.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id. at art. 6.
69
70
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of by other members.79 As a result of these stringent guidelines, private entities only
operate on the ISS if they are sanctioned by all the members of the ISS Agreement.80
Finally, the ISS Agreement identifies legal damages that include intellectual
property claims through its “Cross-Waiver of Liability” in Article 16.81 In addition to
physical damages, the ISS Agreement defines damages as “loss of revenue or profits”
or “other direct, indirect or consequential damage[s].”82 Pursuant to Article 16, each
Partner of the ISS Agreement waives their rights to specific activities conducted on
the ISS which applies to all damage claims “whatever the legal basis for such claims”
are.83 This cross-waiver includes all intellectual property damage claims against ISS
Partners and disclaims responsibility for entities related to ISS partners.84 This
language suggests that even though the ISS agreement recognizes patent protections,
ISS Partners or entities affiliated with ISS Partners are not liable for patent
infringement damages.85 However, The ISS Agreement does not define how an entity
is considered to be affiliated with an ISS partner. As a result, this could mean private
nonstate actors or international space organizations. Besides, the cross-waiver does
not address whether a private nonstate actor is liable for infringing upon the patents
of another private nonstate actor.
Therefore, a petitioner seeking relief for process patent infringement on the ISS
is unlikely to recover.86 The vagueness and gaps within the aforementioned outer space
treaties demonstrate that attempting to find relief within their legal framework is

ISS Agreement, supra note 42, at art. 21.
But cf. Rochus Moenter, The International Space Station: Legal Framework and Current
Status, 64 J. AIR L. & COM. 1033, 1041 (1999) (arguing that “[i]t can be safely argued that there can
be many State Parties involved in a given space activity and it will then be up to the States involved
to designate one State to exercise authority and Supervision or even entrust the control to the State
of registry”). See generally Yan Ling, Prevention of Outer Space Weaponization under International
Law: A Chinese Lawyer's Perspective, 4 J. E. ASIA & INT’L L. 271, 274 (2011) (proposing that the Chinese
and U.S. governmental interests for space activity may be at cross-purposes which may result in the
weaponization of outer space).
81 ISS Agreement, supra note 42, at art. 16; see also Mary Catherine Devlin & William G. Schmidt,
Legal Issues Continue to Surround the International Space Station, 8 U.S. A.F. ACAD. J. LEGAL STUD.
237, 246 (1997-1998) (“Article 16 recognizes that other nations besides the Partner States may be
offered the opportunity to send astronauts to and conduct experiments on the Space Station. For
example, due to the fact that the Russians do not have enough money, there is talk about the Ukraine
building one of the Russian modules for the ISS. In this case, liability can be waived for all claims
against the Ukraine.”). See generally J. Michael Low, It’s The End Of The World As We Know
It . . . And I Feel Fine: The New Rules For Drafting Liability Waivers In Arizona, 16 FEDERATION OF
REGULATORY COUNSEL JOURNAL 1, 1 (2005) (“The purpose of these waivers is twofold: (1) to inform
customers about the potential risks of a particular activity, and (2) to show that the customer
understand and voluntarily assumes those risks.”).
82 ISS Agreement, supra note 42, at art. 16.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 See also A. M. Balsano, Space Technology and International Cooperation - The Role of
Intellectual Property, 20 AIR & SPACE L. 177, 182 (1995) (hypothesizing that the “space station is likely
to result in a more significant demand for legal protection of products invented in outer space or
patented products used for experimentation and production in outer space”).
86 Mark A. Lemley, Inducing Patent Infringement, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 225, 226 (2005) (“It is a
fundamental principle of patent law that no one infringes a patent unless he practices the complete
invention.”).
79
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unlikely.87 The international treaties and agreements focus on more scientific remedies
instead of addressing intellectual property issues. A private patent holding entity, like
the hypothetical American company, would not find relief under the Outer Space
Treaty since the entity is a nonstate actor. As a nonstate actor the private entity would
not be considered a “state” under the Outer Space Treaty.
Also, it is unlikely that a private patent holding entity would find relief through
the Liability Convention. Unlike the Outer Space Treaty and the Registration
Convention, the Liability Convention identifies recoverable damages. However, since
the Liability Convention expressly does not apply to private entities, the patent
infringement would only apply to private entities who shared a patent with their
signatory government.
In contrast, the ISS Agreement provides a better patent protection framework for
private patent holding entities.88 Unlike the previous international treaties, the ISS
Agreement specifically identifies patent protections for its signatories. Moreover, the
ISS Agreement extends the territory of its Partners, meaning that a private
patentholder would be protected by the country that their invention is patented in. For
example, if the American companies’ pressurizing method was patented in the United
States, then under the ISS agreement, the patent would still be protected on the ISS.
Inversely, if the American company invented the pressurizing method on the ISS, the
method would still be protected under the extraterritorial provision of the ISS
agreement. Though the patent holding company would have their patents identified
through the extraterritorial application of the ISS Agreement, acquiring damages is
unlikely. Partners to the agreement disclaim all liability for damages occurring on the
ISS through their actions or the actions of their affiliates. Which means that if the
Russian government infringed, a private American patent holding company would not
have an actionable patent claim. Correspondingly, a privately-owned Russian
company that infringed upon the patent rights of a privately-owned American
company could not be held liable.
IV. PROPOSAL
The ISS IGA needs a comprehensive patent regime to clearly identify and protect
private nonstate third parties from process patent infringement onboard the ISS. This
patent regime would ensure that private outer space companies could rely on having
outer space discoveries and inventions protected under patents.89
87 Michael Smirnoff, The Problem of Security in Outer Space in Light of the Recently Adopted
International Convention on Liability in Outer Space, 1 J. SPACE L. 121, 127 (1973).
88 Glenn Harlan Reynolds, International Space Law: Into the Twenty-First Century, 25 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 225, 232 (1992) (proposing that “[p]roperty rights, properly implemented, would be a
real boon to the rapid development of outer space, with concurrent economic and political benefits to
those of us here on Earth”).
89 See generally Brian J. Love, Interring the Pioneer Invention Doctrine, 90 N.C. L. REV. 379, 414
(2012) (arguing that “[p]rospect theory thus suggest that innovation is optimally incentivized when a
single entity is vested early on with broad patent rights that allow it to control an entire technological
filed. If broad rights do indeed encourage the development and commercialization of improved
embodiments and related inventions, one might expect broad rights to be particularly beneficial for a
pioneer inventor whose invention by definition created an entirely new field of technological
endeavor.”).
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Some may argue that further international agreements allowing the
commercialization of space runs counter to the international community’s opposition
to ownership of outer space.90 However, without a clear patent regime, private space
companies will be reluctant to share their intellectual property discoveries.91
First, a proposed patent regime must be consistent with the purposes of the
original outer space treaties and agreements. A consistent purpose builds on the
historical and diplomatic framework regarding outer space usage dating back over fifty
years.92 Potential international purposes include scientific investigation, peaceful
cooperation, space exploration, and legal matters regarding the use of outer space.
However, grounding a new patent regime in past international treaties and
agreements still runs into difficult political and diplomatic obstacles. Admittedly,
large-scale international agreements are difficult to negotiate and implement,
especially with a large number of potential signatory countries.93
Second, a proposed patent regime must either extend or supplement the territorial
jurisdiction of patent host countries. Extending territorial jurisdiction physically is
difficult due to a lack of scientific consensus on the boundaries of outer space.94 For
example, the U.S. military, the National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics, and
NASA establish outer space as being 50 miles above sea level.95 In contrast, the
Fédération Aéronautique Internationale determines that the boundaries of outer space
is 62.5 miles above sea level.96 Consequently, imposing a spatial framework for
territorial jurisdiction must be supplemented by a uniform standard for all Partner
States.97 Third, a proposed patent regime must have an identifiable and operational
90 See F. Taniguchi, M. Sato & D. Saisho, Consideration on the International Regime of the Moon
Agreement, 53 PROC. INT’L INST. SPACE L. 161, 163 (2010); see also John G. Sprankling, Owning the
Center of the Earth, 55 UCLA L. REV. 979, 1021 (2008) (“[P]rivate property rights cannot exist in the
moon and other celestial objects.”).
91 See generally Wilbur Ross, Secretary of Commerce, U.S. Department of Commerce, Remarks
at the Second Meeting of the Reconstituted National Space Council (Feb. 21, 2018) (“The countries
new to space actually have an inherent advantage in terms of the regulatory environment because
they carry no baggage from the earlier, simpler days of space.”).
92 See generally 156 CONG. REC. 12, 17121 (2010) (“[T]o build upon the cooperative and mutually
beneficial framework established by the ISS partnership agreements and experience in developing
and undertaking programs and meeting objectives designed to realize the goal of human space
flight.”).
93 See also Christoph Moser et al., Why Do Trade Negotiations Take So Long?, 27 JOURNAL OF
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION, 280, 288 (2012) (positing that “[a]s the number of participants and the
diversity of their preferences grow, it becomes increasingly difficult to imagine a successful conclusion
to
the
Doha
Round”);
cf
Treaties:
A
Historical
Overview,
U.S.
SENATE,
https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Treaties.htm#3 (last visited Nov. 4,
2019).
94 Ezra J. Reinstein, Owning Outer Space, 20 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 59, 95 (1999).
95 Bhavya Lal & Emily Nightingale, Where is Space? And Why Does That Matter? 4 (Space Traffic
Management
Conference)
(Nov.
5,
2014),
https://aerospace.csis.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/09/Where-is-Space_-And-Why-Does-That-Matter_.pdf.
96 See generally FÉDÉRATION AÉRONAUTIQUE INTERNATIONALE, Statutes Approved by the FAI
General
Conference
(Sept.
28-29,
2000),
https://www.fai.org/sites/default/files/documents/statutes2019_0.pdf (“The Fédération Aéronautique
Internationale (FAI) is a world federation consisting of national and international aeronautic and
astronautic organisations subscribing to the Statutes.”).
97 See Gary Myers, Intellectual Property Resources in and for Space: The Practitioner’s Experience,
32 J. SPACE L. 385, 411 (2006).
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remedy for patents that are infringed. Beneficial remedies recognize the patentholders’
right of exclusion and provide a deterrence against future patent infringement.98
To satisfy these three necessary requirements for a new patent regime, the ISS
IGA must add an additional clause (“Clause 7”) in Article 21 specifically establishing
a patent regime for private nonstate third parties onboard the ISS. First, Clause 7
would define the term “private entity” as an individual, organization, or business
which is primarily privately owned and/or managed by nonstate affiliates. Specifically
defining the term “private entity” prevents confusion as to what entities qualify under
the agreement and the difference between “public” and “private.”99 This definition
would also support the connection of Clause 1 in Article 21 to “Article 2 of the
Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization.”100 A succinct
definition also alleviates international concerns that the changes to the ISS IGA
pushes out Partner State influence.101 Some in the international community may still
point out that Clause 7 still pushes towards a trend of outer space privatization.
However, this argument fails to consider that private entities in outer space have
operated in space almostas comprehensively as national organizations.102
Second, Clause 7 would supplement territorial jurisdiction by only applying to
the activities on or within the ISS. This is consistent with the current language of the
ISS Agreement which only applies to ISS Partner States and sanctioned private
individuals or entities.103 Admittedly, Clause 7 would not apply to patent infringement
on other privately-owned space objects.104 However, planned future stationary space
objects are controlled completely by private space companies instead of national
governments.105
Third, Clause 7 would provide a remedy against infringement similar to the
exclusionary principles found in Article 6 of the ISS Agreement. Article 6 demonstrates
that all ISS Partner States must concur before equipment may be used from private
entities or non-Partner States. Under Clause 7, this concurrence would stipulate that
private individuals or entities which commit verified patent infringement onboard the
ISS may have their privileges onboard the ISS revoked by Partner States. Revoked
privileges could include a temporary ban in participation in ISS procurement actions

See Ira V. Heffan, Willful Patent Infringement, 7 FED. CIR. B.J. 115, 116 (1997).
See Gregory Messenger, The public–private distinction at the World Trade Organization:
Fundamental challenges to determining the meaning of “public body”, 15 INT’L J. CONST. L. 60, 62
(2017).
100 ISS Agreement, supra note 42, at art. 21.
101 See E. E. Weeks, Applying International Space Law Precedent to Space Tourism, Space Mining
and Space Settlement, 49 PROC. ON L. OUTER SPACE 490, 496 (2006).
102 See Pamela L. Meredith, Spacecraft Failure-Related Litigation in the United States: Many
Failures, but Few Suits, 38 PROC. ON L. OUTER SPACE 22, 25 (1995).
103 See generally ISS Agreement, supra note 42, at art. 5. (stating that “the Government of
Canada, the European Governments listed in the preamble which become parties to this Agreement,
as well as any other European Government that may accede to this Agreement in accordance with
Article 25(3), acting collectively as one Partner, the Government of Japan, the Government of the
Russian Federation, and the Government of the United States”).
104 Accord. Martin Menter, Jurisdiction over Man-Made Orbital Satellites, 2 J. SPACE L. 19, 21
(1974).
105 Rachel A. Yates, Minimizing Regulation of Space Tourism to Stimulate Commercial, Private
Launch Capabilities, 49 PROC. ON L. OUTER SPACE 60, 60 (2006).
98
99
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or operating within Partner States on Earth.106 Furthermore, Clause 7 would assert
private individuals or entities which have previously committed patent infringement
could possibly be barred from operating onboard the ISS altogether. This would be
similar to the United Nations Ineligibility List which bars vendors from participating
in U.N. procurement actions if they engaged in unethical business practices.107
Linking patent infringement to business consequences promotes stronger
corporate compliance and relieves ISS Partner States of national liability for private
actions. Strong private compliance encourages “fewer legitimate claims, fewer
lawsuits, and lower legal costs.”108 Self-regulation also allows ISS Partner States to
continue to guard their cross-waiver of liability.109
Finally, self-regulation avoids enforcement issues between ISS Partner States
when patent infringement occurs.110 Treaties and international agreements are only
as effective as the foreign governments that enforce them.111 Moreover, international
treaties only apply to their state signatories, not private individuals or entities.112
However, if one Partner State refuses to exercise Clause 7, the patent infringer may
still be penalized by the remaining Partner States since uniform concurrence is
necessary to interact with private entities onboard the ISS.113
Alternatively, it could be argued that this method of penalization fails to provide
an identifiable legal remedy.114 Legal scholars disagree as to whether a breach of an
international contract “amount[s] to a breach of international obligations of the state
as a subject of international law and hence engage its international responsibility.”115
In response, Clause 7 could provide a specific adjudicatory forum that private entities
must agree to for all disputes related to alleged patent infringement.

106 See Ralph L. Kissick, Commercial Space Launch Contracts: Disputes and Remedies, 4 J.L. &
TECH. 31, 36 (1989) (arguing that many “launch facility use agreements have what could be called
termination for cause clauses, giving the Government agencies the contractual right to terminate the
contract for certain specifically enumerated reasons”).
107 UNDP entries to the UN ineligibility list, UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME,
https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/operations/procurement/business/protest-andsanctions/ineligibility-list/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2019).
108 George M. Burditt, Corporate Compliance Audits, 51 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 217, 218 (1996).
109 ISS Agreement, supra note 42, at art. 16; see Paul B. Larsen, Cross-Waivers of Liability, 35
PROC. ON L. OUTER SPACE 91, 94 (1992). But see Stefan Kaiser; Martha Mejia-Kaiser, Space Passenger
Liability, 48 PROC. ON L. OUTER SPACE 207, 209 (2005).
110 See Marco Ferrazzani & Andre Farand, European Perspective on Lessons Learned from the
Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA) on International Space Station (ISS) Cooperation, 57 PROC. INT’L
INST. SPACE L. 293, 296 (2014).
111 Accord. Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in
Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1819 (2007); see Tseming Yang, International Treaty Enforcement
as a Public Good: Institutional Deterrent Sanctions in International Environmental Agreements, 27
MICH. J. INT’L L. 1131, 1156 (2006).
112 Atip Latipulhayat, Privatization of Space Law - Negotiating of Commercial and BenefitSharing Issues in the Utilization of Outer Space, 55 PROC. INT’L INST. SPACE L. 243, 246 (2012).
113 ISS Agreement, supra note 42, at art. 5.
114 See Yang, supra note 111, at 1156 (arguing that “As a public good, treaty enforcement must
overcome collective difficulties in getting states to contribute to the cost of enforcement”).
115 Francisco Orrego Vicuna, Of Contracts and Treaties in the Global Market, 8 MAX PLANCK Y.B.
U.N. L. 341, 345 (2004).
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V. CONCLUSION
Without an identifiable patent regime aboard the ISS, private non-state entities
will be forced to rely on a patchwork of decades-old international treaties to protect
their investments. This patchwork patent protection threatens future international
cooperation with other companies, scientific organizations, or governments.
The ISS Agreement must add an additional clause in Article 21 specifically
establishing a patent regime for private nonstate third parties onboard the ISS. This
addition to the ISS Agreement would affirm the goals of the international space
community, expand the territorial jurisdiction for patents in outer space, and provide
usable remedies for patentholders. Patentholders could be confident that whatever
inventions or processes they patented on Earth would be protected on the ISS.
Furthermore, patentholders could be confident that being a private entity in space does
not invite or guarantee patent infringement.116

116 See Richard M. Lebovitz, The Duty to Disclose Patent Rights, 6 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP.
36, 41 (2007) (arguing that an untrustworthy patent system could potentially lead to mistrust among
scientists). Contra Brian J. Love, Bad Actors and the Evolution of Patent Law, 101 VA. L. REV. ONLINE
1, 12 (2015-2016). See generally Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV. 115,
215 (2003) (arguing that “[i]f a prize system is to match the patent system, it might seem that the
government must provide some form of guarantee. A sufficiently rigid formula or algorithm can serve
this purpose, assuring that the inventor will profit from innovation. Without such a guarantee, the
government might do a poor job in distributing prizes, rewarding unmeritorious inventions over
meritorious ones.”).

